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2OPINION 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
In this § 1983 action, Michael
Tyrone Walker, a state prisoner, alleges
that his rights under the First, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments were violated
when prison officials sought a state court
order authorizing them to force-feed him
after he went nine days without eating.
The district court granted summary
judgment to all of the defendants except
Arthur Auxer, a prison official; and Dr.
Mark Lasky, the medical director of the
prison.  Shortly before their trial began,
Walker withdrew his claims against Auxer,
leaving Lasky as the sole remaining
defendant.   The jury ultimately returned a
verdict in favor of Lasky, and Walker
appealed.  For the reasons that follow, we
will affirm.
I.  BACKGROUND1
In August 1995, Walker was
incarcerated in the Special Management
Unit (“SMU”) at the State Correctional
Institution at Camp Hill, Pennsylvania
(“SCI-Camp Hill”).  The SMU was
reserved for the most difficult prisoners in
the state system and Walker’s placement
there meant that he was confined in his cell
twenty-three hours a day.  
Walker is a member of the Nation of
Islam, a self-proclaimed Islamic sect that
follows the teachings of Elijah
Muhammad.  Members of the Nation of
Islam fast during Ramadan and at other
times during the year in accordance with
the teachings of Elijah Muhammad.
Walker claims that since his incarceration
in 1988 he has engaged in periodic
religious fasts in which he abstains from
solid foods but drinks liquids. 2  
Walker’s Prison Adjustment Record
reflects that on August 20, 1995, he
became angry,  allegedly because he was
not receiving legal material.3 He made
threats, became argumentative, and was
placed on further restriction even though
he was already in the SMU.  A few days
later, while still confined in the SMU,
Walker claims to have begun a religious
fast which he planned to continue for three
to fifteen days.  Like his earlier fasts, he
purportedly abstained from solid food, but
drank liquids.  
Beginning on August 26, 1995,
Walker was seen at least daily by prison
medical staff.  William Young, M.D., a
physician on the medical staff at SCI-Camp
Hill under Dr. Lasky’s supervision,
examined Walker on that date.  Walker
claims that Dr. Young checked his weight
and blood pressure, listened to his
1Unless otherwise specified,
references to testimony refer to testimony
that was presented in the district court.
2The fasts last from three to thirty
days.
3Walker had numerous civil and
criminal cases pending at the time. 
3breathing, and examined his eyes.4 Walker
also claims that Dr. Young noted that
Walker was fasting for religious purposes.
Walker claims that Dr. Young recorded his
condition as “normal” on August, 26, 27,
28, 29 and 30.  Walker’s weight was
recorded as 193 pounds on August 27,  192
pounds on August 28, 189 pounds on
August 29,  and 190 pounds on August 30.
According to Dr. Young’s testimony,
weight loss becomes a concern when a
person who is fasting loses ten percent of
their weight.  Young directed that blood
and urine be obtained from Walker on
August 27 and 28.5   According to Walker,
Dr. Young never urged him to stop fasting
or exercising.
On August 26, 1995, the medical
staff read Walker a form captioned, “The
Effects of Starvation and Dehydration,”
and Walker acknowledged the form by
signing it. In doing so, he attested to his
understanding “that the Department of
Corrections will do everything within its
power to prevent the death of any person
committed to its custody, and . . . this
means that permission may be sought from
a judge to force [an inmate] to eat or
drink.”  
On August 31, 1995, after what the
prison officials claim was nine days of
documented refusal to eat, the Department
of Corrections (“DOC”) filed an ex parte
application for a preliminary injunction in
state court pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1531. The
complaint alleged that Walker was on a
hunger strike.  An affidavit of Dr. Lasky
dated August 30, 1995 was attached to the
complaint.  In that affidavit, Lasky stated
that, based upon his observations earlier
that day, Walker “appeared somewhat
lethargic, slow walking and spoke with a
slight slur.” Lasky’s affidavit further stated
that those symptoms “could be the effects
of starvation and dehydration” and that
unless Walker received nutrition and
hydration “as soon as possible,” he could
suffer “tissue breakdown . . .  which may
result in coma, cardiac arrest and possibly
death.”  The affidavit also stated that
feeding was required to prevent
“irreparable harm.” Lasky had not
examined Walker before executing that
affidavit, but he had spoken to Walker
through his cell door.   However, Walker
claims that Dr. Lasky had not spoken with
him and that the doctor actually confused
him with another inmate.
In addition to Dr. Lasky’s affidavit,
the complaint alleged that Walker’s
“conduct threaten[ed] the good order of the
SCI-Camp Hill in that other inmates may
engage in hunger strikes as a result of
[Walker’s] conduct or may believe that [the
Department] is not concerned with their
well being.”   Other prisoners were
allegedly already engaged in “copy-cat”
4Dr. Young purportedly recorded
Walker’s weight as 190 pounds.
5According to prison officials,
medical personnel including Drs. Young
and Lasky, had to devote time and
resources to observing Walker in his cell.
In addition, prison employees had to
scrupulously keep track of the food going
in and out of Walker’s cell.
4hunger strikes.6
The DOC also asked the state court
for authorization to provide treatment
including, but not limited to, nutrition,
hydration, and medication, as medically
necessary to preserve Walker’s health and
life pending the adjudication of the matter.
The DOC also sought permission to
involuntarily obtain specimens of bodily
fluids for analysis.
On August 31, 1995, the Court of
Common Pleas of Cumberland County
entered an order allowing the prison
officials to, inter alia, “involuntarily
administer . . . medical treatment including
but not limited to nutrition, hydration and
medication as may be medically necessary
to preserve [Walker’s] health and life
pending the adjudication of this matter, as
is determined by the medical personnel
duly charged with his care.”  The court also
scheduled a hearing for September 5, 1995,
and appointed counsel to represent Walker
at that hearing.   
Thereafter, Lasky informed Walker
that the medical department had obtained a
court order authorizing force-feeding.
Walker claims that he told  Lasky that he
was fasting for religious reasons and that
Lasky ignored him.  A short time later,
correction officers took Walker from his
cell to the prison infirmary.7  Walker
claims that he was there stripped, strapped
to a hospital bed, and placed in ankle and
wrist restraints.   His head was also
restrained, and a chest strap was used to
prevent him from moving.8   A corrections
officer then read Walker the court order,
and gave him a copy of it.
Walker claims that he told officials
standing near his bed that he was willing to
stop his hunger strike to avoid being force-
fed as he was being strapped to the bed.9
However, Lasky testified that Walker never
stated he was willing to eat before he was
force-fed.  Rather, the prison officials
testified that Lasky gave Walker the option
of eating, and Walker refused. Walker
claims that Auxer told him that his
concession to eat came too late.  In any
event, after Walker was strapped to the
bed, nurses placed a nasogastric tube
6It was alleged that two other
prisoners, neither of whom were members
of the Nation of Islam, were on hunger
strikes at the same time as Walker.  They
were not force-fed because they ultimately
agreed to eat.  
7Walker acknowledged he was on a
hunger strike when he arrived at the prison
infirmary. 
8 Lasky testified that he reasonably
believed that it was necessary to use
restraints so that Walker: (1) would not
harm himself by trying to remove or
partially remove the nasogastric tube on his
own; (2) necessitate another procedure to
insert the tube; (3) would not harm others;
and (4) so that he could more easily be
observed.  
9 SMU Manager William Ward and
Associate Manager Arthur Auxer were
standing by Walker’s bed along with Drs.
Young and Lasky.
5through his nose, down his throat and into
his stomach, and Walker was then force-
fed through the tube.  The procedure was
videotaped. 
Walker claims that he was fed
liquified liver and mashed potatoes with
milk even though he told medical
personnel that the did not eat meat or milk
products because both foods upset his
stomach.10  Lasky allegedly let Walker be
force-fed the foods that were being served
to the general prison population for the
noon meal.  Lasky denies that Walker told
anyone he was a vegetarian or that
Walker’s medical records stated that
Walker was a vegetarian.  However, Lasky
confirms that Walker was force-fed
mashed potatoes and milk.  
Sometime after the force-feeding of
the noon meal, Walker claims to have told
medical personnel, including Lasky, that he
was willing to stop his fast and that he
reiterated that certain foods upset his
stomach.  Lasky purportedly responded by
telling Walker that the feeding tube would
not be removed and that Walker would be
required to eat the evening meal with the
feeding tube in place.  When told that the
evening meal would include spaghetti with
meat, Walker claims to have again told
Lasky that this meal would upset his
stomach.  
Lasky denies any intention of
making Walker sick and testified that he
believed the food did not pose a substantial
risk of serious harm. Walker claims that he
only ate the meal under threat of force-
feeding because he was in great
discomfort.  
Walker testified that the force-
feeding made him vomit during the night
and that, since he was still restrained, he
choked.  Walker claims that he asked
Lasky to remove the feeding tube the
following morning, but Lasky said that the
tube would remain until after breakfast the
following day.  Walker also testified that
he was strapped to the bed by ankle and
wrist restraints throughout this period and
that he was released from the restraints
only for short periods during the day.  
The nasogastric feeding tube was
finally removed on September 2, 1995 –
two days after its insertion.  Lasky testified
this was a reasonable period after Walker
began eating on his own to insure against
having to reinsert the tube, to minimize
medical risks of complication, and to
assure that Walker could be provided with
nutrition if he again refused to eat.
Three days later, Walker and his
lawyer were present at a hearing the Court
of Common Pleas held on the DOC’s
request for authorization to force-feed
Walker.  During that hearing, Walker’s
counsel told the state court: “I would like
to just add for the record, Judge, the Mr.
Walker’s reason for the hunger strike was
to draw attention to some civil matters
being addressed by Jim Flower [another
lawyer representing Walker] in another
civil matter and that his agreeing to an
extension of the preliminary injunction in
this case in no way impacts or constitutes
10 Walker claims his medical records
verified that he was a vegetarian.
6any admission for the purposes of Mr.
Flower’s proceeding.”
II.  DISTRICT COURT
PROCEEDINGS
On March 22, 1996, Walker filed a
pro se § 1983 complaint against Martin
Horn,11 Commissioner, Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections,  Jeffrey H.
Beard, Deputy Commissioner, Kenneth
Kyler, Superintendent SCI-Camp Hill,
William Ward, Unit Manager SMU, SCI-
Camp Hill, Arthur Auxer, Manager SMU
(hereinafter collectively “prison
officials,”)12, Martin L. Lasky, D.O.,
Medical Director, SCI-Camp Hill and
William Young, M.D.,13 physician,
Medical Department, SCI-Camp Hill.
Walker alleged  violations of the First,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
arising from being force-fed.14  
The court appointed counsel for
Walker and Walker thereafter filed an
amended complaint.  In time, the
magistrate judge filed a Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”), recommending
granting summary judgment to Horn,
Kyler, Ward, and Young on all of Walker’s
11Horn was the Commissioner at the
time of the filing of the complaint.  He has
since been replaced by Jeffrey Beard.
1 2The prison officials are
represented by the General Counsel of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  It is
unclear from Walker’s brief whether the
prison officials were sued in their official
or individual capacities.  Their brief notes:
[I]t is understood based on
c o n v e r s a t i o n s  w i t h
[Walker’s] counsel and the
arguments posed by him,
that this appeal is against the
Secretary of Corrections in
his official capacity for
injunctive relief.  As such,
the Eleventh Amendment is
not implicated.  To the
extent that this appeal, which
clearly does not involve the
personal actions of any
individual Corrections
officials but the Department
as a whole, requests
monetary damages, it is
barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.  Similarly,
because it is understood that
Walker seeks equitable
relief, Corrections officials
have not briefed the issue of
qualified immunity, to which
they would be entitled if
monetary relief were sought.
Prison Officials’ Br. at 3 n.1.
13Drs. Lasky and Young are
represented by private counsel because
they are not employees of the Department
of Corrections. They work for medical
contractors.  
14Walker also asserted a claim under
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.  The
district court dismissed that claim and it is
not implicated in this appeal.
7claims.  The R&R also recommended
granting Beard, Auxer and Lasky summary
judgment on Walker’s Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim. However,
the magistrate judge rejected the qualified
immunity arguments of Beard, Auxer and
Lasky and also recommended against
dismissing Walker’s First and Eighth
Amendment claims under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine.  
The district court adopted the
magistrate judge’s R&R with two
exceptions.  The district court granted
summary judgment to Beard on all of
Walker’s claims and found that the claims
for injunctive relief were moot.   The
district court rejected claims of lack of
jurisdiction and qualified immunity of
Auxer and  Lasky pertaining to Walker’s
First and Eighth Amendment claims.  Both
Lasky and Auxer appealed but we
dismissed the appeals for lack of appellate
jurisdiction because genuine issues of
material fact remained as to whether Lasky
and Auxer were entitled to qualified
immunity.15  Walker v. Horn, 286 F.3d 705
(3d Cir. 2002).  
Thereafter, Walker withdrew his
claims against Auxer and the case
proceeded to a jury trial involving only Dr.
Lasky.  The jury found that Walker was not
involved in a religious fast and that Lasky
had not violated Walker’s constitutional
rights.  The district court thereafter entered
judgment in favor of Lasky.  Walker then
filed this appeal in which he argues that the
district court erred in granting summary
judgment to the defendants on his
procedural due process claim and that the
district court erred in admitting evidence of
his prior robbery convictions pursuant to
Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(2) in the trial of his
constitutional claims against Lasky.16  
III.  DISCUSSION
A.  Our Jurisdiction to Address
Walker’s Procedural Due Process
Claim.
Walker submits that he has a liberty
interest under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and a state-
created liberty interest against being force-
fed.17  He also claims that the Constitution
requires procedural safeguards to ensure
that a decision to force-feed someone is
neither arbitrary nor erroneous, and that the
prison officials and Lasky ignored those
procedural safeguards.18  
15We do have appellate jurisdiction
where the district court finds that there is
no qualified immunity as a matter of law.
In re Montgomery County, 215 F.3d 367,
373-74 (3d Cir. 2000).  
16Because no prison officials were
involved in the trial, they have not briefed
any issues related to the trial.
17State-created liberty interests are
entitled to the procedural protections of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480,
488 (1980) (citation omitted).  
18Briefly, Walker argues that he
should have been afforded the following
procedural safeguards: the decision to
obtain a state court order should have been
8Before we can address the merits of
Walker’s constitutional claims, we must
first address the parties arguments about
whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
deprives us of jurisdiction over those
claims.19  
“The Rooker-Feldman20 doctrine
arises from 28 U.S.C. § 1257 which states
in relevant part that ‘[f]inal judgments or
decrees rendered by the highest court of a
state in which a decision could be had, may
be reviewed by the Supreme Court. . . .’” 21
Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 296 (3d
Cir. 1992).  “Since Congress has never
conferred a similar power of review on the
United States District Courts, the Supreme
Court has inferred that Congress did not
intend to empower District Courts to
review state court decisions.”  Desi’s Pizza,
Inc. v. City of Wilkes Barre, 321 F.3d 411,
419 (3d Cir. 2003)(citations omitted); see
reviewed by a committee; he should have
been invited to appear in state court by
telephone; all of his medical records should
have been attached to the complaint; and a
physician other than Lasky should have
been the affiant in the state court
proceeding.
19The district court held that
Rooker-Feldman did not preclude it from
having jurisdiction over Walker’s due
process claim.  We exercise plenary review
over the district court’s application the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  Parkview
Assoc. P’ship v. City of Lebanon, 225 F.3d
321, 323-34 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Neither the prison officials nor
Lasky filed an appeal from the district
court’s Rooker-Feldman ruling.  However,
because their argument, if accepted, would
be an alternative way of affirming the
district court’s decision to grant summary
judgment to the prison officials and the
jury verdict in favor of Lasky, they need
not file an appeal to make this argument.
See Resolution Trust Co. v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co. of Maryland, 205 F.3d 615,
635 (3d Cir. 2000).  Moreover, since that
ruling goes to our subject matter
jurisdiction, it can’t be waived.  
20The doctrine was spawned by two
Supreme Court cases decided sixty years
apart, viz.,  Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C. Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
21In its entirety, § 1257(a) reads:
“Final judgments or decrees rendered by
the highest court of a State in which a
decision could be had, may be reviewed by
the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari
where the validity of a treaty or statute of
the United States is drawn in question or
where the validity of a statute of any State
is drawn in question on the ground of its
being repugnant to the Constitution,
treaties, or laws of the United States, or
where any title, right, privilege, or
immunity is specially set up or claimed
under the Constitution or the treaties or
statutes of, or any commission held or
authority exercised under, the United
States.”  
9also Port Auth. Police Benevolent Assoc.,
Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J. Police
Dept., 973 F.2d 169, 179 (3d Cir. 1992)
(“[T]he fundamental principle of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine [is] that a federal
district court may not sit as an appellate
court to adjudicate appeals of state court
proceedings.”).  
“To ensure that Congress’s intent to
prevent the lower federal courts from
sitting in direct review of the decisions of
a state tribunal is given effect, the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine prohibits District Courts
from adjudicating actions in which the
relief requested requires determining
whether the state court’s decision is wrong
or voiding the state court’s ruling.”22
Desi’s Pizza, 321 F.3d at 419 (citations,
internal quotations, bracket and ellipses
omitted).  Although § 1257 refers to orders
and decrees of the highest state court, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine has been applied
to final decisions of lower state courts as
well.  Port Auth. Police Benevolent Assoc.,
973 F.2d at 178. 
Thus, “a claim is barred by Rooker-
Feldman under two circumstances: first, if
the [federal] claim was ‘actually litigated’
in state court prior to the filing of the
federal action or, second, if the [federal]
claim is ‘inextricably intertwined with [the]
state adjudication,’ meaning that ‘federal
relief can only be predicated upon a
conviction that the state court was wrong.’”
Desi’s Pizza, 321 F.3d at 419 (citation
omitted).  In either case, “Rooker-Feldman
bars a litigant’s federal claims [and] divests
the District Court of subject matter
jurisdiction over those claims.”  Id. at 419.
Determining whether a plaintiff
“actually litigated” a federal claim in the
state court for Rooker-Feldman purposes is
not always as easy as may at first appear
because Rooker-Feldman “has a close
affinity to the principles embodied in the
legal concepts of claim and issue
preclusion.”  Valenti, 962 F.2d at 297.
Therefore, a plaintiff cannot ordinarily
litigate one constitutional claim in state
court and then raise a related constitutional
claim in the district court.  Id.  In Valenti,
plaintiffs litigated an equal protection
claim in state court and then sought to raise
a First Amendment claim in the district
court.  We held that Rooker-Feldman
deprived the district court of subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate the First
Amendment claim.  We explained:  
 [Plaintiffs] each had an
opportunity to raise a first
amendment challenge [in
state court] and failed to do
so.  They cannot be allowed
to escape Rooker-Feldman
b y  r a i s i n g  a  n e w
constitutional theory in
federal court.  Under
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  c l a i m
preclusion, they had a full
and fair opportunity to
litigate their first amendment
22Habeas corpus petitions are, of
course, an exception to the Rooker-
Feldman jurisdictional bar.  Blake v.
Papadakos, 953 F.2d 68, 72 n. 2 (3d
Cir.1992)(quoting Sumner v. Mata, 449
U.S. 539, 543-44 (1981)).
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claim in the state court, and
here they merely seek a
second bite at the apple.
Valenti, 962 F.2d at 296.
A federal claim is “inextricably
intertwined” with an issue adjudicated by a
state court when:  (1) the federal court must
determine that the state court judgment was
erroneously entered in order to grant the
requested relief, or (2) the federal court
must take an action that would negate the
state court's judgment. Desi’s Pizza, 321
F.3d at 421 “In the first circumstance . . .
Rooker-Feldman bars the plaintiff's federal
claim because granting the plaintiff relief
would require the federal court to conclude
that the State Court made an incorrect
factual or legal determination. In cases
falling into this category, federal relief can
only be predicated upon a conviction that
the state court was wrong.”  Id. (citation
and internal quotations omitted).  That
inquiry requires that we identify the pillars
on which the state-court judgment rests.
“To do this, we consider the questions of
state law that the state court was obligated
to reach in order to render its decision.”  Id.
In the second situation discussed above,
“the plaintiff's federal claim is precluded
because the relief sought would undo or
prevent the enforcement of the state court's
order.”  Id. at 422.   In other words,
“Rooker-Feldman does not allow a
plaintiff to seek relief that, if granted,
would prevent a state court for enforcing
its orders.”  Id.
Here, prison officials argue that
Walker’s procedural due process claim is,
in essence, a request to a lower federal
court to review a state court injunction
authorizing the prison officials to force-
feed Walker.  They claim that a finding in
Walker’s favor on his procedural due
process claim would necessarily be a
federal ruling that the state court order was
wrong.  They are thus claiming, in Rooker-
Feldman terminology, that Walker’s due
process claim is “inextricably intertwined”
with the state court adjudication.
Therefore, say the prison officials, the
procedural due process claim is barred by
Rooker-Feldman and the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over that
claim.
In making this argument, they rely
heavily on Port Authority Police
Benevolent Association, Inc. v. Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey
Police Department, 973 F.2d 169 (3d Cir.
1992).  There, the Port Authority obtained
an injunction from a state court prohibiting
a nonprofit organization employed by the
Police Benevolent Association from
soliciting contributions from Port
Authority tenants.  In state court, the Police
Benevolent Authority unsuccessfully
argued that solicitation was protected
speech under the First Amendment and that
the Port Authority regulations prohibiting
soliciting tenants violated its First
Amendment rights.  
The Police Benevolent Association
then went to federal court and asserted the
same constitutional claim they had asserted
in the state court action.  They asked the
district court for an injunction preventing
11
the Port Authority from enforcing its
antisolicitation regulations.  The
Association conceded that the federal
injunction would effectively enjoin the
enforcement of the state court’s injunction
if granted, and the district court abstained
under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971).  On appeal, we held that the district
court properly abstained under Younger,
but also noted that the district court could
have dismissed the complaint pursuant to
Rooker-Feldman because assertion of
jurisdiction over the compliant would have
required the district court to decide issues
that were “inextricably intertwined” with
the state court’s decision.  973 F.2d at 177.
The prison officials argue that Port
Authority Police Benevolent Association
controls because Rooker-Feldman prevents
the district court from ruling on the
propriety of the state court order allowing
Walker to be force-fed.  Walker counters
by arguing that his procedural due process
claim does not require the district court to
review the propriety of the state court
injunction or to find that the state court’s
decision was wrong.  Admit tedly,
Walker’s due process claim is not a frontal
attack on the propriety of the state court
order.   However, it nevertheless questions
the propriety of the state court’s order.
Walker’s constitutional claim is bottomed
on his theory that the prison officials had
inadequate procedural safeguards to insure
that the state court’s ruling would be based
upon accurate and complete information.
Walker correctly claims that the state
court’s order was based exclusively on
Lasky’s affidavit.  However, says Walker,
Lasky never examined him and, in fact,
confused him with another prisoner.
Moreover, says Walker, the complaint
seeking state injunctive relief did not
include an affidavit from Dr. Young, who
had examined him several times, or a copy
of relevant medical records.  In Walker’s
view, had there been a Department of
Corrections requirement that his medical
records and an affidavit of his treating
physician be attached to the complaint, the
state court would have learned that Walker
was being examined by a physician on a
daily basis, was not dehydrated, sustained
no weight loss between August 26 and
August 30, 1995, and was otherwise in
good health.  However, says Walker,
because of the lack of procedural
safeguards, the state court record lacked
the information necessary to guarantee that
the state court’s decision was not arbitrary
or erroneous.   He writes: “Had minimal
procedural safeguards been provided, the
state court would have learned that the
affidavit [of Lasky] was incorrect and that
force-feeding was not warranted because
Mr. Walker’s treating physician had
concluded that Mr. Walker was in good
health.”  Walker’s Br. at 14.  
In our view, Walker is simply saying
that the state court’s decision was wrong
and blaming the error on certain alleged
procedural deficiencies.  
For example, Walker argues:
[b]ecause Dr. Lasky never examined
Mr. Walker and, . . . confused [him] with
another inmate . . . important statements in
[Lasky’s] affidavit were erroneous . . . As
a result, the state court was completely
12
misled . . .  Had Mr. Walker been given
notice and the opportunity . . . to
participate in the proceeding, the state
court would have learned that statements in
Mr. Lasky’s affidavit were erroneous.
Moreover had DOC regulations required
defendants to attach to their application for
. . . ex parte relief a copy of Mr. Walker’s
medical records or an affidavit from the
treating physician, it would have been
immediately apparent to the state court that
Dr. Lasky’s affidavit was incorrect.
Walker’s Br. at 16-17
Walker is clearly claiming that had
he been given adequate procedural due
process, the state court would not have
entered an erroneous order to force-feed
him.  Thus, Walker’s due process claim is
“inextricably intertwined” with the state
court adjudication.   He cannot prevail on
his procedural claim unless we pull the
thread that will unravel the constitutional
fabric of the state court’s order.
Consequently, Rooker-Feldman bars
Walker’s due process claim and the district
court had no subject matter jurisdiction
over it.  Accordingly, we need not address
Walker’s argument that the district court
erred by granting summary judgment to the
defendants on his procedural due process
claim.23
B.  Admission of Robbery Convictions.
As noted earlier, as a result of the
district court’s summary judgment rulings
and Walker’s withdrawal of claims against
Auxer, Walker’s only remaining claims
were his claims that Lasky violated his
First and Eighth Amendment rights, and
the jury returned a verdict in Lasky’s favor
on those claims.24
23Walker argues that because we
have repeatedly held that Rooker-Feldman
applies only to “final decisions” of state
courts, see, e.g., FOCUS v. Allegheny
County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d
834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996), it cannot bar his
due process claim because there was no
final decision by a state court.  Rather,
there was only a preliminary injunction,
which, under Pennsylvania law, is not a
final merits decision, but a temporary
remedy granted until a dispute can be
completely resolved.  Reply Br. at 4.
However, this contention ignores that we
have held that the doctrine also applies
where a state court issues a preliminary
injunction because “the preliminary
injunction issued by [the state court]
resolve[s], at least for the moment, the
dispute between the parties that forms the
basis of the federal complaint.”  Port Auth.
Police Benevolent Assoc., 973 F.2d at 178.
24As noted in n.13 supra, Lasky is
not an employee of the DOC.  He is an
employee of a private medical organization
under contract to provide medical services
to the inmates at SCI-Camp Hill.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has held
that a physician who is under contract to
provide medical services to inmates at a
state prison acts “under color of state law”
for § 1983 purposes.  West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 54 (1988).  
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During the trial, Lasky’s counsel
sought to introduce evidence of Walker’s
prior record to impeach his credibility.  In
the ten year period before the trial, Walker
had been convicted of two charges of
simple assault, four firearms violations,
one charge of terroristic threats and nine
robberies.  Lasky’s counsel referred to
these convictions in his opening statement.
Later, Walker moved to exclude the
convictions pursuant to Fed.R.Evid.
609(a)(1).25  In a two-part ruling, the
district court granted Walker’s motion with
respect to the convictions for assault,
firearms violations and terroristic threats,
finding that the probative value of the
convictions was outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice.  However, the district
court held that, because the crime of
robbery involves dishonesty within the
meaning of Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(2), the
court was “without discretion to weigh the
prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence
against its value” and, therefore, “evidence
of the [robbery] conviction is automatically
admissible for impeachment purposes.”
App. at 8.
Fed.R.Evid. 609 provides, in
relevant part:
(a) General rule. For the
purposes of attacking the
credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness
other than an accused has
been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted, subject to
Rule 403, if the crime was
punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of
one year under the law under
which the witness was
convicted, . . . .; and
(2) evidence that any witness
has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted if it
involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the
punishment.
Fed.R.Evid. 609(a).   Therefore, “if the
prior conviction involved dishonesty or
false statements, the conviction is
automatically admissible insofar as the
district court is without discretion to weigh
the prejudicial effect of the proffered
evidence against its probative value.”
Walden v. Georgia-Pacific, Inc., 126 F.3d
506, 523 (3d Cir. 1997).   “Because Rule
609(a)(2) does not permit the district court
to engage in balancing, . . . Rule 609(a)(2)
must be construed narrowly to apply only
to those crimes that bear on a witness’
propensity to testify truthful ly.”
Id. (citation omitted). 
Walker contends that the district
court erred by holding that robbery is a
25Walker’s counsel admits that he
initially conceded that the robbery
convictions were admissible; however,
before the second day of trial began,
counsel changed his mind and argued that
they were not admissible.  Walker’s Br. at
30 n.15.
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crime involving dishonesty, and that the
district court therefore erred in allowing
counsel to use his robbery convictions for
impeachment purposes.26  In support of that
argument, he cites to the original
Conference Committee Report which
spoke of the types of crimes contemplated
by subsection (a)(2):
   By the phrase “dishonesty
and false statement” the
Conference means crimes
such  as  pe rj ur y o r
subornation of perjury, false
statement, criminal fraud,
embezzlement, or false
pretense, or any other
offense in the nature of
crimen falsi, the commission
of which involves some
e l e m e n t  o f  d e c e i t ,
u n t r u t h f u l n e s s ,  o r
falsification bearing on the
accused’s propensity to
testify truthfully.  
H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. p.
7051, 7058, 7103.  He then refers to the
Advisory Committee note following the
1990 amendment to Rule 609(a)(2) which
reads:
The Advisory Committee
c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  t h e
Conference Report provides
sufficient guidance to trial
cour t s  an d  tha t  n o
a m e n d m e n t  [ t o  t h e
dishonesty and fals e
statement provision] is
necessary, notwithstanding
some decisions that take an
unduly broad view of
“dishonesty” admitting
convictions such as for bank
robbery or bank larceny.
Fed.R.Evid. 609 Advisory Committee Note
to 1990 amendment. In light of these
statements, Walker submits that crimes
involving dishonesty are limited to the
types of crimes explicitly detailed in the
two statements above and this excludes
robbery because it is not a crime involving
dishonesty.   
It is somewhat surprising that we
have not yet decided whether robbery
involves dishonesty within the meaning of
Rule 609(a)(2).   However, in a case
decided before the effective date of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, we did hold
that petit larceny is not a  crimen falsi
crime.  In Government of the Virgin
Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278 (3d Cir.
1976), we wrote:
   The term crimen falsi has
roots in the common law
doctrine that persons
convicted of certain kinds of
crimes were disqualified
from testifying.  While the
doctrine of testimonial
26The construction of Rule 609 is an
issue of law over which we have plenary
review.  Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,
126 F.3d 506, 522 (3d Cir. 1997).  
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disqualification has withered
from our law, the term
crimen falsi has retained
vitality in the context of
i m p e ac h me n t .   T h e
established law in this circuit
is that a witness may be
impeached by evidence of a
prior conviction only if it is
for (a) a felony or (b) a
misdemeanor in the nature of
crimen falsi.  The specific
contours of crimen falsi are
uncertain.  Crimen falsi
describes crimes involving,
or at least relating to,
communicative, often
verbal, dishonesty; we have
said that they are crimes
which touch on the honesty
of the witness.  For our
purposes here, we have no
difficulty in accepting the
government’s formulation of
the concept: “Although the
term ‘crimen falsi’ has been
subject to many definitions,
the generally accepted scope
of the term would be crimes
that are in the nature of
perjury, criminal fraud,
embezzlement, false pretense
or any other offense the
commission of which
involves some element of
u n t r u t h f u l n e s s ,  o r
falsification bearing on the
accused’s propensity to
testify truthfully.”  Absent
special circumstances, as the
district court so aptly put it:
“Petit larceny is just not
that.”
Id. at 281 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).   However we also noted that, in
certain cases, petit larceny may be a crimen
falsi crime. We explained: “It is
conceivable that a conviction for petit
larceny might subsume a crime in the
nature of crimen falsi, e.g., ‘petit’ stealing
by false pretenses.”  Id.  In a case decided
after the effective date of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, we held that a crime must
involve expressive dishonesty to be
admissible under Rule 609(a)(2).  In Cree
v. Hatcher, 969 F.2d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 1992),
we stated: “The proper test for
admissibility under Rule 609(a)(2) does not
measure the severity or reprehensibility of
the crime, but rather focuses on the
witness’s propensity for falsehood, deceit
or deception.”  Applying that teaching
here, we readily conclude that, although
robbery is certainly a very serious crime, it
does not involve communicative or
expressive dishonesty.  Therefore, the
district court erred by holding that robbery
is a crime involving dishonesty that is
automatically admissible under Rule
609(a)(2).27
27 The Model Penal Code states: “an
individual commits robbery if in the course
of committing a theft he inflicts or
threatens injury, or commits or threatens to
commit a felony. . .” U.S. v. Williams, 344
F.3d 365, 375 (3d. Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted).  One can
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Of course, that does not end our
inquiry.  Under Fed.R.Evid. 103(a),
admitting Walker’s robbery convictions for
impeachment is not reversible error “unless
a substantial right of a party is affected.”
Our standard of review of a district court’s
nonconstitutional error allows us to find an
error harmless only if it is highly probable
that the error did not affect the outcome of
the case.  McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust
Co., 779 F.2d 916, 917 (3d Cir. 1985).  
Not unexpectedly, Walker argues
that the admission of his robbery
convictions was not harmless error because
his credibility was central to his ability to
prove his claim that Lasky violated his First
and Eighth Amendment rights.  He reminds
us that he was the only witness who
testified that he is a practicing member of
the Nation of Islam and that he was
engaged in a religious fast when he was
forcibly fed.  He was also the only witness
who testified that, contrary to Lasky’s
affidavit, he gave a blood and urine sample
as ordered by Dr. Young.28  Finally, his
testimony also provided the only evidence
that he had never been offered a liquid
protein supplement by Lasky.29  Therefore,
according to Walker, the evidence of his
robbery  conv ic t ions  s ign if icantly
undermined his credibility.  He argues: “the
only reasonable explanation for the jury
finding that [he] failed to prove he was
engaged in a religious fast was that he was
not, in their minds, a credible witness.”
Walker’s Br. at 37. 
 Walker stresses that his lack of
credibility was the central theme of Lasky’s
counsel’s closing argument.30   According
to Walker, Lasky’s counsel argued that
Walker’s testimony about the religious
basis of his fast was simply not credible.
Rather, argued Lasky’s counsel, Walker
just did not want Dr. Young, who
examined him daily, to interfere with his
hunger strike, and Walker therefore used
the magic words “religious fast.”   Walker
also contends that Lasky’s counsel argued
that even though Walker told Dr. Young
that he was on a religious fast and Dr.
Young noted this in the medical records on
August 26, Dr. Young had no independent
verification that the fast was religious and
that Walker’s statement could not be taken
at face value.  
Lastly, and finally, Walker contends
that Lasky’s counsel told the jury that they
needed to consider Walker’s credibilityobviously commit a theft without
employing deceit (i.e. a pickpocket).
Therefore, the theft that is required for
robbery does not transform that crime of
violence into a crimen falsi crime.
28Lasky’s affidavit recites that
Walker refused to permit a physician to
obtain blood and urine samples for analysis
to determine his condition.
29Lasky’s affidavit recites that
Walker refused a liquid protein
supplement.
30However, Walker does not claim
that Lasky’s counsel’s closing argument
was improper.
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while deliberating reminding them that
Walker had been “convicted of crimes of
dishonesty nine times, the robberies.” In
Walker’s telling, because the robbery
convictions were central to Lasky’s efforts
to discredit his testimony, the introduction
of the convictions was not harmless.
Lasky contends that, given the very
limited use of the robbery convictions and
the amount of other evidence bearing on
Walker’s credibility, it is highly
improbable that the robbery convictions
affected the outcome of Walker’s case at
all.  Moreover, says Lasky, since Walker
testified on direct examination that he was
residing at SCI-Camp Hill at the time of
the incident eight years earlier, and was
currently residing at SCI-Pittsburgh, the
jury had to have known that Walker had a
significant criminal record that included
convictions for serious crimes.  Further,
says Lasky, during cross-examination,
Walker mentioned a third prison, SCI-
Smithfield, where he had been
incarcerated.  In Lasky’s view, given the
small amount of time spent on the actual
impeachment and the fact that Walker
testified that he had been incarcerated in
three different prisons over at least the
previous eight years, any prejudice from
t h e  r o b b e r y c o n v i c t io n s  w as
inconsequential.
Lasky next refers us to the
significant amount of other evidence
regarding Walker’s credibility.  According
to Lasky, even Walker’s religious motive
for fasting is something of a red herring.
No mention was made of a religious  fast
during argument over the preliminary
injunction in the state court.  In fact,
Walker’s counsel in the state court said the
fast was not religious at all, but was an
attempt to focus attention on Walker’s then
pending litigation.  Lasky supports this
with evidence that a friend and fellow
litigant of Walker’s, Darrel Alston,
engaged in a hunger strike and was not a
member of the Nation of Islam.
Lasky cites evidence corroborating
his contention that Walker’s motives were
not religious.  As we noted earlier, just
before Walker stopped eating, he had an
argument with the guards over access to his
legal materials.  He was written up for
misconduct and put on further restriction.
Walker had five civil and two criminal
cases pending at the time, and access to his
legal materials was therefore important to
him.  Prison policy allowed only one box
of legal materials in his cell at any one
time, and the rest had to be kept in
storage.31  Lasky claims this policy was the
reason for the argument and Walker went
on a hunger strike in protest, that he now
seeks to redefine as a religious fast. 
Lasky notes the conflicting evidence
about when Walker would fast, the number
of years he had engaged in fasts and the
average duration of his fasts.  The evidence
of fasting was first once or twice a month,
then every weekend, then for three days or
as long as fifteen days.  Walker’s trial
testimony was different than his deposition,
and that was different than allegations in
31Walker could trade at any time to
get different materials, but was limited to
one box at a time. 
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his amended complaint.  There was also a
discrepancy about when Walker became a
member of the Nation of Islam.
Walker testified on direct
examination that he was forced to eat and
drink milk which made him ill.  He also
testified that he was a vegetarian, but
admitted on cross-examination that he ate
meat, just not red meat, and never notified
the prison that he was vegetarian although
he claims his medical records state that he
was.  He testified that he could not have
milk for health reasons, but on cross-
examination admitted that no one ever told
him that he was lactose intolerant.  In fact,
argues Lasky, there was a video of Walker
voluntarily drinking milk with breakfast.
Not only did Walker not get sick, he asked
for more milk.  Finally, Walker testified
that he told Lasky and the prison officials
that he would eat, but later admitted that he
had not eaten when given the opportunity.
According to Lasky, given this
stream of contradictions, the admission of
the robbery convictions was harmless.
Lasky argues: “It is counterintuitive to
think that the passing reference to Mr.
Walker’s robbery convictions, in light of
the jury’s knowledge of three prison stays
over at least the past eight years, affected
the outcome in light of all of the other
evidence elicited at trial.”  Lasky’s Br. at
24.  We agree.  Walker’s own testimony
that he had been incarcerated in three state
prisons certainly informed the jury that he
had a substantial criminal record.  There
was also a substantial amount of other
evidence that affected Walker’s credibility
as noted above.  Therefore, it is highly
improbable that the error in admitting the
robbery convictions had an impact on the
outcome of the trial.32  
C.  Collateral estoppel.
One small matter remains.  Lasky
argues that Walker’s First and Eighth
Amendment claims are barred by the
doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue
preclusion.33  We disagree.  “Under
collateral estoppel, once a court decides an
issue of fact or law necessary to its
judgment, that decision precludes
relitigation of the same issue on a different
cause of action between the same parties.”
Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S.
461, 467 n.6 (1982) (citation omitted).  “It
is now settled that a federal court must give
to a state-court judgment the same
preclusive effect as would be given that
judgment under the law of the State in
which the judgment was rendered.”  Migra
32We also note that the jury may
well have entertained other doubts about
the nature of Walker’s fast.  He testified to
fasting from August 25th to August 30th.
Yet, he weighed 190 pounds on the 25th
and still weighed 190 pounds after five
days of fasting.  Moreover, after two days
of fasting, on August 27th, he actually
gained three pounds.
33The terms “collateral estoppel”
and “issue preclusion” are frequently used
interchangeably.  See Burlington N. R.R. v.
Hyundai Merchant Marine, Co. Ltd. (3d.
Cir. 1995).  63 F.3d 1227, 1231, n.2.  We
will refer to the doctrine as “collateral
estoppel.”
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v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465
U.S. 75, 81 (1984).  Under Pennsylvania
law, the following conditions must exist
before collateral estoppel may be invoked:
(1) the issue decided in the prior
adjudication was identical with the one
presented in the later action; (2) there was
a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party
against whom the plea is asserted was a
party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication; and (4) the party against
whom it is asserted has had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue in question
in a prior action.  Shuder v. McDonald’s
Corp., 859 F.2d 266, 273 (3d Cir. 1988). 
It is readily apparent that the first
requirement for collateral estoppel is not
met here.  The only issue decided in the
state court was whether Walker would
suffer irreparable harm if he were not
force-fed.  The issue in the district court
was whether Lasky violated Walker’s
constitutional rights by force-feeding him.
Those issues are obviously not identical.
Therefore, Walker’s constitutional claims
against Lasky are not barred by collateral
estoppel.  They nevertheless fail for the
reasons we have explained.
IV.
For the above reasons, we will
affirm the judgment of the district court.
  
